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Abstract
The problem of sharing a cost M among n individuals, identified by some
characteristic ci ∈ R+, appears in many real situations. Two important
proposals on how to share the cost are the egalitarian and the proportional
solutions. In different situations a combination of both distributions provides
an interesting approach to the cost sharing problem. In this paper we obtain
a family of (compromise) solutions associated to the Perron’ eigenvectors of
Levinger’s transformations of a characteristics matrix A. This family includes
both the egalitarian and proportional solutions, as well as a set of suitable
intermediate proposals, which we analyze in some specific contexts, as claims
problems and inventory cost games.
Keywords: Cost Sharing, Egalitarian, Proportional, Perron’s Eigenvector,
Compromise Solution
1. Introduction
A (cost-surplus) sharing problem consists of the division of a certain
amount M among a group of n agents. We assume that each agent i
(i = 1, 2, . . . , n) is identified by means of a (numerical) characteristic ci
relevant in the distribution of the total amount M. We may find many real
situations covered by this simple model. Let us observe, for instance, the
following ones:
[ 1 ] A typical example is how to allocate the total cost M of a facility (for
instance, a water supply system) among the n towns that will share
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it. The characteristic ci may be, in this example, the proportion of the
total population living in each of these towns. A cost allocation is a
vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) such that x1 + x2 + . . .+ xn = M. The two
more popular ways to share the total cost M are the egalitarian and
the proportional ones (see, for instance, Moulin (1988)).
[ 2 ] Another example comes from analyzing costs in one-to-many distri-
bution systems. This kind of problem has a logistic feature, namely
the distribution cost (see, for instance, Turkensteen and Klose (2012)).
A single facility, whose location is yet to be determined, serves geo-
graphically dispersed demand points (consumers). Once the location
of the facility and the distribution cost (the cost of the optimal delivery
route) M has been obtained, the problem to be analyzed is how this
cost M is allocated to consumers. Again, there are two focal positions:
the cost is allocated in an egalitarian way, so any costumer pays (per
unit) an equal part of the total distribution cost; or, the cost is allo-
cated in a proportional way with respect to the characteristic ci, that
in this example could represent the distance between the facility and
the consumer i, or the cost of a direct delivery from the facility to the
consumer.
[ 3 ] The so-called claims problem (O’Neill, 1982) involves n agents identified
by some claims ci, i = 1, 2, . . . , n on a estate M that is not sufficient
to cover the aggregate claim C =
∑n
i=1 ci, that is C > M. The prob-
lem is how to allocate the estate M among the claimants by taking
into account the claims ci the agents have on it. Among the many
rules defined in this class of problems, two prominent solutions are the
proportional and the egalitarian ones.
[ 4 ] In a recent paper, Karsten and Basten (2014) present a model on how
to share the benefits in pooling of spare parts between multiple users.
As they mention, “important savings may be obtained if pooling is
taken into account. While promising this does raise the question on
how the [users] should share the benefits”. In order to construct their
model, they use the proportional rule to divide the costs (in this case,
proportionality is with respect to the demand rate of each individual).
Instead of using proportionality, an egalitarian allocation could be also
considered. A similar situation may be found in Meca et al. (2004)
(see also Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (2011)) where an inventory cost game
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is presented in order to allocate the benefits of cooperation. They use
a proportional approach in order to define a solution that is proved to
be on the core of the cooperative game.
All of the above situations may be expressed by the abstract model:
An amount M must be shared among agents i = 1, 2, . . . , n by
considering the individuals’ characteristics ci.
As mentioned, the proportional and the egalitarian solutions are two focal
approaches to solve this model. In many situations, a combination of these
solutions could make sense. For instance, if we go back to the water supply
system example, it is clear that the population (the characteristic) of each
town affects the size of the system. Then, a proportional (with respect to the
characteristics) distribution of the cost seems reasonable. But, on the other
hand, most of the cost doesn’t depend on the supplied population, so an egal-
itarian share (regardless of the characteristics) could be as reasonable as the
proportional division. As consequence, a combination of both distributions
provides an interesting approach. Our proposal is within this perspective.
One possibility is to consider convex combinations of these two solutions.
This idea has been recently developed in the context of claims problems
(situation [3]) where the characteristic ci represents the individual i
′s claim
(see Gime´nez-Go´mez and Peris (2014)). In that article they propose the
αmin solution by using a specific convex combination of the egalitarian and
the proportional solutions with the idea of guaranteeing a minimal amount
to each individual (regardless of their claims) and allocating the remaining
in a proportional way.
We propose an alternative approach to obtain intermediate solutions:
instead of taking convex combinations of the egalitarian and proportional
solutions, we use eigenvectors of some suitable matrices. In so doing, we
define the characteristics matrix of a problem as the matrix whose rows are
all identical to the vector of individuals’ characteristics ci. By using this
matrix A, we get an alternative way of obtaining the main solutions. In
particular, the egalitarian solution corresponds to the right eigenvector of
matrix A and the proportional solution corresponds to the left eigenvector
(or, equivalently, to the right eigenvector of the transpose matrix At). Then,
we present our family of compromise solutions for the sharing problem, as
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the ones associated to the Perron’s eigenvectors of each convex combination
of the characteristics’ matrix and its transpose (Levinger’s transformation).
The egalitarian and proportional solutions are obtained for α = 0 and α = 1,
respectively. We analyze the main properties of these compromise solutions
as functions of the parameter α that defines the convex combination.
When analyzing some particular situations, we realize that the egalitar-
ian solution could propose inadmissible allocations. For instance, in situation
[2], if ci represents the cost of the individual delivery, rationality implies that
no agent should pay more than this amount. In situation [3] the character-
istic ci denotes the claim that individual i has on the endowment. Then,
it is obvious that no agent should receive more than her claim. Finally, in
situation [4] it is important the proposal to give an allocation in the core of
the cooperative game. As in the egalitarian case, other solutions associated
to Perron’s eigenvectors of Levinger’s transformations could be inadmissible
proposals. However, we will show that it is always possible to find some
admissible ones.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the mathematical
model we are going to use, and defines the characteristics matrix associated
to a cost sharing problem. In Section 3 we obtain the main properties of
eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the convex combinations of the characteristics
matrix and its transpose. Finally, in Section 4, we analyze some particular
situations (claims problems and inventory cost games).
2. Main definitions
2.1. Cost sharing problems
A cost sharing problem with relevant characteristics is defined by a finite
set of agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n} , the total cost M to be allocated to the
agents, and the characteristics vector1 ct = [c1, c2, . . . , cn], identifying each
agent. The issue is how to share the total cost M among the agents.2
A cost sharing solution (sharing rule) associates to each sharing problem
(M, c), an allocation x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn, such that xi ≥ 0 (no subsidies
1 Throughout the paper, vectors are considered column vectors, vn×1. The transposed
(row) vector is denoted by vt.
2 Although we consider cost sharing problems, our reasoning could be immediately
applied to surplus sharing situations.
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are allowed) and
∑n
i=1 xi = M (efficiency). The value xi is the amount
individual i contributes to the total cost M.
The most popular sharing rules are the egalitarian (Egal) and the pro-
portional (Prop) ones. Equal division establishes that each agent is allocated
the same part of the total amount,
xi = Egali ≡ M
n
, for all i ∈ N.
Proportional division, with respect to vector c establishes the cost allocation
xi = Propi ≡ ci∑n
i=1 ci
M, for all i ∈ N.
If we denote by veg the vector with all entries equal to 1/n, and by vpr the
vector whose i−component is ci∑n
i=1 ci
, then the egalitarian and proportional
solutions may be written as:
Egal = Mveg, P rop = Mvpr.
2.2. Matrix analysis
Given a square positive matrix A (aij > 0, for all i, j), Perron’s theorem
(Perron, 1907) ensures the existence of an eigenvalue of A, λ(A), which is
strictly positive and has associated a positive eigenvector v∗ > 0 such that
Av∗ = λ(A)v∗, and λ(A) = ρ(A), the spectral radius of this matrix.3 We
consider positive eigenvectors normalized so that the sum of its components
is equal to 1,
∑n
i=1 v
∗
i = 1. Note that this fact guarantees the uniqueness of
the associated positive eigenvector.
Given a positive square matrix A, the Levinger’s transformation of A
(Levinger, 1970) is the family of matrices obtained throughout convex com-
binations of A and its transpose At, that is, defined by
A(α) = αAt + (1− α)A α ∈ [0, 1].
We denote by v(α) the normalized positive eigenvector associated with the
dominant eigenvalue λ(α), in the corresponding α Levinger’s transformation.
3 Moreover, this eigenvalue is simple, strictly greater than any other eigenvalue, and
no other eigenvalue has a positive eigenvector associated. See, for instance, Berman and
Plemmons (1994).
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We know (see Fiedler (1995)) that the Levinger’s function, defined by Per-
ron’s eigenvalue λ(α), is a non-decreasing function in the sub-interval [0, 1
2
]
and that it is symmetric about α = 1
2
.
2.3. From eigenvectors to sharing proposals
Any positive normalized vector v∗ > 0 provides a way of sharing an
amount M among n individuals:
xi = Mv
∗
i , i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
If we use the normalized eigenvectors v(α), associated to the Levinger’s trans-
formation A(α), then we obtain a family of possible cost allocations, by
varying the parameter α,
xi(α) = Mvi(α), i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
2.4. A matrix associated to a cost sharing problem
We are not interested in general positive matrices, but in a particular
class defined by the characteristics of the individuals involved in the cost
sharing problem. In order to introduce our matrix, let us consider a cost
sharing problem (M, c) and define the square matrix A associated to this
problem by:
A = ect =

c1 c2 . . . cn
c1 c2 . . . cn
. . . . . . . . . . . .
c1 c2 . . . cn

where et = [1, 1, . . . , 1]. Without loss of generality, we consider the compo-
nents in vector c increasingly ordered:
c1 ≤ c2 ≤ . . . ≤ cn
and normalized (taken in relative sizes), so that
∑n
i=1 ci = 1. It must be
noticed that the (normalized) eigenvector associated to a matrix B coincides
with the one associated to any proportional matrix A = γB, for any γ ∈ R.
This fact allows us to select the matrix associated to a cost sharing problem
with row sum equals to 1.
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Due to the normalization of vector c, matrix A is stochastic4 and it is
immediate to observe that
λ(A) = 1, Aveg = veg, A
tvpr = vpr.
Then, by using our notation as Levinger’s normalized eigenvectors,
Egal = Mv(0), P rop = Mv(1).
Moreover, given these allocations, it is clear that any convex combination
of the eigenvectors, v = αvpr + (1 − α)veg = αv(1) + (1 − α)v(0) defines a
new distribution that provides an intermediate proposal among those.
2.5. Compromise solutions
An alternative approach to obtaining intermediate (compromise) propos-
als could be to compute convex combinations of the matrices A and At and
proposing the Perron’s eigenvector of this convex combination as the way
of defining the new allocation. In other words, we want to use the Perron’s
normalized eigenvector associated to Levinger’s transformation of the char-
acteristics matrix A, A(α) = αAt+(1−α)A. For each α the eigenvector v(α)
defines a solution x(α) = Mv(α) to the cost sharing problem (M, c). We are
interested in analyzing the properties of these allocations as functions of the
parameter α that defines the transformation. First, we show that λ(α) is a
symmetric function that achieves its maximum at α = 1
2
, and moreover we
will prove that it is a concave function. However, our main interest is the
analysis of the behaviour of the normalized components of the positive as-
sociated eigenvectors v(α) as non linear functions of the parameter α, since
these components provide the compromise solution.
Definition 1. Given a cost sharing problem with total cost M and individ-
uals’ characteristics c1 ≤ c2 ≤ . . . ≤ cn, the compromise solution associated
to α ∈ [0, 1] is the allocation defined by
x(α) ≡Mv(α).
4 A stochastic matrix (also termed probability matrix, or Markov matrix ) is a square
matrix such that each of its entries is a non-negative real number representing a probability
(so, each row sum is 1). See, for instance, Berman and Plemmons (1994) for formal
definitions and main properties of stochastic matrices.
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The following example compares the distributions proposed by the egal-
itarian and the proportional solutions and illustrates our compromise solu-
tions.
Example 1. Consider the cost sharing problem of a common facility (a wa-
ter supply system) that will be used by five cities. We suppose that the total
cost is M = 100 (consider percentage) and that the characteristics di are
identified by the population (in thousands) living in each city, that we sup-
pose [d1 = 200, d2 = 240, d3 = 380, d4 = 460, d5 = 720]. Then, the egalitarian
solution gives the cost sharing Egal = (20, 20, 20, 20, 20). The proportional
(with respect to the population in each city) solution proposes the cost sharing
Prop = (10, 12, 19, 23, 36).
The population in each city (normalized so that the total sum of the pop-
ulation is equal to 1) is ct = [0.10, 0.12, 0.19, 0.23, 0.36]. Then, the character-
istics matrix is
A =

0.10 0.12 0.19 0.23 0.36
0.10 0.12 0.19 0.23 0.36
0.10 0.12 0.19 0.23 0.36
0.10 0.12 0.19 0.23 0.36
0.10 0.12 0.19 0.23 0.36

If we now consider the convex combination given by α = 0.3282, the Per-
ron’s eigenvalue is λ(α) = 1.0453 and the cost allocation defined by the
Perron’s eigenvector is x(α) = (16.86, 17.49, 19.69, 20.94, 25.02), which is a
compromise between the egalitarian and the proportional approaches. Note
that this result is different from the one we obtain by considering the convex
combination (for α = 0.3282) of the egalitarian and proportional solutions:
αProp+(1−α)Egal = (16.72, 17.37, 19.67, 20.98, 25.25). In fact, there is not
α ∈ [0, 1] such that the proposal given by x(α) could be obtained as a direct
convex combination of the egalitarian and the proportional solutions.
3. Main properties of the compromise solutions
In Theorem 1 we obtain the expression of the dominant eigenvalue λ(α)
and its main properties. Part of this result is a particular case of a result
stated without proof by Levinger (see Levinger (1970) and Fiedler (1995)).
We provide an elemental proof.
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Theorem 1. Let A be a characteristics matrix. Then, the Levinger’s func-
tion λ : [0, 1] → R, defined by λ(α) = ρ (A(α)) , is continuous, symmet-
ric around α = 1
2
and strictly concave in the interval [0, 1], achieving its
maximum value at α = 1
2
and its minimum at α = 0, and α = 1, where
λ(0) = λ(1) = 1.
Proof. It is easy to check that, for all α ∈ (0, 1), rk (A(α)) = 2, and then
the characteristic polynomial of this matrix is:
pA(α)(λ) = (−λ)n−2
(
(−λ)2 + p1(−λ) + p2
)
,
where p1 and p2 are the order 1 and order 2 trace of matrix A(α),
p1 =
n∑
i=1
ci = 1, p2 = α(1− α)
∑
i<j
(ci − cj)2 .
Then,
λ(α) =
1 +
√
1 + 4α(1− α)∑i<j (ci − cj)2
2
.
We can immediately observe that this function is continuous, symmetric
around α = 1
2
, strictly concave, minimizes at α = 0 and α = 1, and maximizes
at α = 1
2
. Moreover, the greatest value of λ(α) depends on the value B =∑
i<j (ci − cj)2 that can be seen as a “certain degree of variance” of the
components of the characteristics vector c: λ
(
1
2
)
=
1 +
√
1 +B
2
.
Example 2. Consider the matrix A defined by individuals’ characteristics
vector ct = [0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.25, 0.45]. Figures 1, 2 and 3 show, respectively,
the graph of λ(α), the graph of the components of the positive normalized
eigenvector associated to λ(α), vi(α), and the graph of their second derivative,
v′′i (α), for α ∈ [0, 1] and i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
As we can observe, the eigenvalue function is as indicated in Theorem
1. On the other hand, the components of the eigenvector functions do not
intersect and have a monotone behaviour (some of them increasing and the
remaining ones decreasing). More interesting is the behaviour of the second
derivative of the eigenvector functions: each component changes from concave
to convex, or vice-versa, but all of them do this change at the same value of
α. We will prove later that these properties are true in general (see Theorems
3 and 4).
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Figure 1: λ(α) as a function of α in Example 2.
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Figure 2: v1(α), v2(α), v3(α), v4(α), v5(α), from bottom to top in Example 2.
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Figure 3: v′′1 (α), v
′′
2 (α), v
′′
3 (α), v
′′
4 (α), v
′′
5 (α) in Example 2.
In the following result we show that, for a fixed α, the components of
the positive eigenvector v(α) are increasingly ordered. This fact is useful in
their application to distribution problems, since the characteristics ci often
represent some rights or duties and then a desirable property is that more
rights (duties) deserve more revenues (payments), which are given by vi(α).
Theorem 2. Let A be a characteristics matrix and v(α) the normalized
Perron’s eigenvector associated to the Levinger’s transformation A(α) =
αAt + (1 − α)A. Then, vi(α) ≤ vi+1(α), for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1 and all
α ∈ [0, 1]
Proof. The proof is based on the fact that we can compute the positive
eigenvector v(α) by using the power method (see, for instance, Berman and
Plemmons (1994))
v(α) = lim
k→∞
Ak(α)e
etAk(α)e.
Then, it is enough to observe that, for any k, Ak(α)e is a conic combination of
vectors e and c and then it preserves the order provided by c, independently
of the value of α ∈ [0, 1].
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As an immediate consequence, we obtain that our compromise solutions
satisfy the (desirable) property of characteristic monotonicity. When applied
to claims problems (situation [3]) it means that greater claims obtain greater
allocations. In cost sharing problems (situations [1], [2], [4]) greater demands
imply greater cost.
Corollary 1. Let us consider a cost sharing problem (M, c). Then, the com-
promise solutions x(α) are characteristic monotonic:
ci ≤ cj ⇒ xi(α) ≤ xj(α) ∀α ∈ [0, 1].
Our next result analyzes the behaviour of functions vi(α) and shows how
they increase or decrease, by depending on the value of ci.
Theorem 3. Let A be a characteristics matrix and v(α) the normalized
Perron’s eigenvector associated to the Levinger’s transformation A(α) =
αAt + (1− α)A. Let us suppose c 6= 1
n
e. Then,
a) vi(α) is a decreasing non linear function in the interval [0, 1] for all i
such that ci <
1
n
b) vi(α) is an increasing non linear function in the interval [0, 1] for all i
such that ci >
1
n
c) vk(α) is a constant function in the interval [0, 1] if ck =
1
n
In order to prove Theorem 3 we will use the following Lemma. Let us denote
by ek the k−th vector in the canonical basis, ekk = 1, ekj = 0, for each j 6= k.
Lemma 1. Let V the space generated by vectors e and c, V = 〈e, c〉. Then,
a) V ⊥ = {w ∈ Rn | wtA(α) = 0} for all α ∈ (0, 1).
b) v(α) ∈ V for all α ∈ [0, 1].
c) ek ∈ 〈V ⊥, e〉⇔ ck = 1n .
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Proof. In order to prove part a) note that
A(α) = αcet + (1− α)ect,
so every vector w ∈ V ⊥ fulfills wtA(α) = 0. As the dimensions of both vector
spaces coincide (note that rk(A(α)) = 2, for α ∈ (0, 1)) we obtain the result.
b) Let w ∈ V ⊥, w 6= 0, α ∈ (0, 1) and v(α) the positive eigenvector
associated to λ(α). From part a),
wtλ(α)v(α) = wtA(α)v(α) = 0.
As λ(α) 6= 0, v(α) ∈ (V ⊥)⊥ = V.
c) Let us consider {w1, w2, . . . , wn−2} a basis of V ⊥ and suppose that
there exist µ, µ1, µ2, . . . , µn−2 ∈ R such that
ek = µe+ µ1w
1 + µ2w
2 + . . .+ µn−2wn−2.
Then,
(ek)tA(α) = µetA(α) + µ1(w1)tA(α) + . . .+ µn−2(wn−2)tA(α) =
= µetA(α) = µαet + µ(1− α)nct.
On the other hand,
(ek)tA(α) = αcket + (1− α)ct.
From both equalities, we obtain,
(1− nµ)(1− α)ct = α(µ− ck)et,
for all α ∈ (0, 1); then
1− nµ = 0; µ− ck = 0 ⇒ ck = 1
n
.
Conversely, if ck =
1
n
, by taking µ = 1
n
, it is easy to observe that(
ek − µe)tA(1
2
)
= 0.
That is,
(
ek − µe) ∈ V ⊥, so ek ∈ 〈V ⊥, e〉 .
Proof of Theorem 3.
Parts a) and b): since vi(0) =
1
n
, and vi(1) = ci, it is enough to prove
that for all i such that ci 6= 1n , then v′i(α) 6= 0, ∀α ∈ (0, 1). If there is some i,
and some α∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that v′i(α∗) = 0, then we have:
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[ 1 ] (ei)tv′(α∗) = v′i(α
∗) = 0
[ 2 ] etv′(α∗) = 0, since etv(α∗) = 1
[ 3 ] (wj)tv′(α∗) = 0,∀j = 1, 2, . . . , n− 2, as a consequence of Lemma 1
As rk (ei, e, wj, j = 1, 2, . . . , n− 2) = n, the linear system
[ 1 ] (ei)tx = 0,
[ 2 ] etx = 0,
[ 3 ] (wj)tx = 0,∀j = 1, 2, . . . , n− 2,
has a unique solution x = 0, so v′(α∗) = 0. We are going to show that this
fact is not possible. If we compute
(v(α))tA(α)v(α) = λ(α)
n∑
i=1
vi(α)
2
(v(α))tA(α)v(α) = (v(α))t (A+ α(At − A)) v(α) = n∑
i=1
civi(α)
Equalizing both terms, and evaluating the derivatives at α = α∗:
n∑
i=1
civ
′
i(α
∗) = λ′(α∗)
n∑
i=1
vi(α
∗)2 + λ(α∗)
n∑
i=1
2vi(α
∗)v′i(α
∗)
As v′(α∗) = 0, and v(α∗) 6= 0, then λ′(α∗) = 0, so α∗ = 1
2
. On the other
hand, by computing ctA(α)v(α), with a similar argument we obtain that
n∑
i=1
civi(α) =
α
∑n
i=1 c
2
i
λ(α)− 1 + α
By deriving and substituting at α∗ = 1
2
,
0 =
(
n∑
i=1
c2i
)
λ
(
1
2
)− 1(
λ
(
1
2
)− 1
2
)2
which is not possible.
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Part c): Lemma 1 establishes the equivalence between conditions ck =
1
n
and ek = 1
n
e+
∑n−2
j=1 µjw
j. Then,
(ek)tA(α)v(α) = λ(α)(ek)tv(α) = λ(α)vk(α)
and
(ek)tA(α)v(α) = 1
n
etA(α)v(α) +
n−2∑
j=1
µj(w
j)tA(α)v(α) =
=
1
n
λ(α)
n∑
i=1
vi(α) =
1
n
λ(α)
As λ(α) 6= 0, we obtain vk(α) = 1
n
, for all α ∈ (0, 1).
Remark 1. The case not covered in this result, c = 1
n
e, is obvious since then
matrix A is a scalar matrix, aij =
1
n
for all i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n. In this case
A(α) = A for all α ∈ [0, 1]. Then the eigenvector is constant, v(α) = 1
n
e for
all α ∈ [0, 1].
In the case of a cost sharing problem, the above result splits the set
of agents into two groups: those who have characteristics greater than the
average (ci >
1
n
) and those under it. For the first ones, function vi(α) (the
amount they pay) is increasing with α, whereas for the rest of agents it is
decreasing.
Our last result analyzes the concavity/convexity of the vi(α) functions.
The most interesting fact is that all of them change from concave to convex
(or vice-versa) at the same point, which is near to 1
3
independently of the
number of individuals.
Theorem 4. Let A be a characteristics matrix and v(α) the normalized
Perron’s eigenvector associated to the Levinger’s transformation A(α) =
αAt + (1 − α)A. Let us suppose c 6= 1
n
e. Then, there is αg ∈ (0, 1) such
that for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
a) vi(α) is a convex function in the interval [0, αg] and a concave function
in the interval [αg, 1], if ci <
1
n
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b) vi(α) is a concave function in the interval [0, αg] and a convex function
in the interval [αg, 1], if ci >
1
n
Proof. We are going to prove that there is αg ∈ (0, 1) such that the second
derivative of vi(αg) equals to zero, for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n. From the equalities:
etA(α)v(α) = λ(α),
etA(α)v(α) = α + (1− α)nctv(α),
we obtain
n
n∑
i=1
civi(α) =
λ(α)− α
1− α .
By taking the second derivative in the above expression,
n
n∑
i=1
civ
′′
i (α) =
λ′′(α)(1− α)2 + 2λ′(α)(1− α) + 2λ(α)− 2
(1− α)3 .
On the other hand, if we compute the first and the second derivatives in
the expression of λ(α) obtained in Theorem 1 and we substitute them in the
above equation, we get that:
n∑
i=1
civ
′′
i (α) = 0⇔ F (α) = 16Bα3 − 24Bα2 + (9B − 3)α + (1−B) = 0,
where B =
∑
i<j(ci − cj)2. As F (0) = 1− B > 0, and F (1) = −2 < 0, there
is αg ∈ (0, 1) such that F (αg) = 0. Moreover, since F (+∞) = +∞, F (α)
changes its sign after α = 1, so it has a real root at some α > 1. With a
similar reasoning, since F (−∞) = −∞, F (α) has a real root at some α < 0.
Then αg is the unique root in the interval (0, 1) .
As rk {wi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 2} is a basis of V ⊥ and V = 〈e, c〉, it is clear
that rk {c, e, wi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 2} = n. Then, the linear system
[ 1 ] ctx = 0,
[ 2 ] etx = 0,
[ 3 ] (wj)tx = 0,∀j = 1, 2, . . . , n− 2,
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has a unique solution, x = 0. As v′′(αg) satisfies all conditions, then we obtain
v′′i (αg) = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. It can be proved (see Remark 2) that αg <
1
3
.
Now, we only need to characterize the components functions vi(α) that
change from concave to convex, and vice-versa. As the only zero point for
the second derivative is αg, we only need to investigate what happens in a
point of the interval (αg, 1].
λ(α)vk(α) = (e
k)tA(α)v(α) = αck + (1− α)
n∑
i=1
civi(α).
1
n
λ(α) =
1
n
λ(α)etv(α) =
1
n
etA(α)v(α) = α 1
n
+ (1− α)
n∑
i=1
civi(α).
By subtracting both equalities, we obtain:
vk(α) =
α
λ(α)
(
ck − 1
n
)
+
1
n
.
Computing the second derivative at αˆ = 1
2
we get:
sign (v′′k(αˆ)) = sign
(
ck − 1
n
)
and the required result holds.
Remark 2. By solving the third order equation that appears in the previous
theorem
16Bα3 − 24Bα2 + (9B − 3)α + (1−B) = 0
it is not hard to obtain the explicit expression for αg :
αg = 1/2
1−
√
B + 1
B
cos

arccos
(√
B
B + 1
)
+ pi
3


Figure 4 shows the graph of this function. An approximation is obtained with
the fifth order Taylor polynomial, taken at B = 1
3
. This expression is useful
to see that 1
3
is an upper bound of αg.
αg ≈ 1
3
− 0.0264B + 0.01335B2 − 0.00818B3 + 0.00437B4 − 0.00130B5.
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Figure 4: αg, as a function of B =
∑
i<j (ci − cj)2 .
Theorem 4 provides an endogenous way to select a particular value of α
in order to select a compromise solution.
Definition 2. Given a cost sharing problem with total cost M and individ-
uals’ characteristics c1 ≤ c2 ≤ . . . ≤ cn, we call αg−compromise solution to
the allocation defined by
Si(αg) ≡Mvi(αg) i = 1, 2, . . . , n
where αg is the value obtained in Theorem 4.
Example 3. Consider again the cost sharing problem in Example 1. Then,
we first compute the values B = 0.215 and αg ≈ 0.3282. Then, the allocation
defined by the Perron’s eigenvector v(αg) is
S(αg) = (16.86, 17.49, 19.69, 20.94, 25.02),
which is a compromise between the proposals of egalitarian and the propor-
tional approaches.
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The αg−compromise solution sets an abstract compromise based on the
mathematical properties of the solution. The meaning of this solution will
depend on the model o situation we have. From the mathematical point
of view, as the increase of a component in vector x(α) involves decrease in
other (others) component, there is no optimal way (for all individuals) to
select one of these compromise solutions. If we select the ’inflection’ point
αg each agent whose participation in the total cost increases with respect to
α
(
ci >
1
n
)
minimizes her increasing rate at αg. Reciprocally, if an agent’s
allocation decreases with respect to α
(
ci <
1
n
)
she maximizes her decreasing
rate at αg. In this sense the αg point gives a (mathematically) coherent
compromise solution.
Remark 3. Nevertheless, this particular solution could yield a “non-admi-
ssible” allocation in some situations. For instance, if we have a claims
problem (situation [3]) with endowment M = 100, and agents’ claims ct =
[15, 18, 28.5, 34.5, 54], the characteristics matrix coincides with the one in Ex-
ample 1, so the αg−compromise solution coincide. Then, agent 1 is allocated
x1 = 16.86 that is greater than her claim, and this solution is not admissible
in claims problems. This trouble is caused because the egalitarian solution
itself Egal = (20, 20, 20, 20, 20) is not admissible. A similar consideration
could be made with respect to situation [4] in which the proposals are usu-
ally required to belong to the core of the cooperative game and, in general,
the egalitarian solution does not fulfill this condition. We discus this kind of
situations in the next section.
4. A compromise solution as egalitarian as possible
As mentioned, an egalitarian allocation is no always an admissible so-
lution, in the sense that it is not rational, or does not belong to the core.
However, we could be interested in finding an allocation “as egalitarian as
possible”. As we have shown, our compromise solutions x(α) provide a fam-
ily of intermediate proposals from the egalitarian (α = 0) to the proportional
(α = 1). Then, we can find suitable values of α in order the allocation x(α)
to be admissible and then to find the most egalitarian compromise solution
among the admissible ones.
Although the notion “as egalitarian as possible” can be defined in any
context, we analyze the problem in two particular situations: inventory cost
games and claims problems.
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4.1. Inventory cost games
The inventory cost game is defined by associating to every inventory cost
situation (N, a, (mi)i∈N) ,5 the characteristic function:
c(S) = 2a
√∑
i∈N
m2i , for S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅; c(∅) = 0.
Meca et al. (2004) propose a solution in the core of the game defined in a
proportional way, that they call SOC-rule:
SOCi ≡ c
2(i)∑n
j=1 c
2(j)
c(N) i ∈ N.
This is a kind of proportional solution, where proportionality is taken with
respect to the characteristics ci = c
2(i).
Nevertheless, the egalitarian allocation
xi =
c(N)
n
i ∈ N,
has not been used in this context since, in general, it does no belong to
the core. In our family of compromise solutions we may find the minimum
value of α such that x(α) belongs to the core (that is, we may obtain the
most egalitarian compromise solution in the core of the inventory cost game).
This solution is obtained by finding:
αeq = min
{
α ∈ [0, 1] :
∑
i∈N
xi(α) = c(N),
∑
i∈S
xi(α) ≤ c(S), for all S ⊂ N
}
This minimal value always exist since x(1) coincides with the proportional
solution (the SOC-rule) and x(α) is continuous with respect to α.
In order to illustrate the range of values of α such that x(α) gives an
allocation in the core of the game, we use the following example taken from
Meca et al. (2004) slightly modified.6
5 N = {1, 2, . . . , n} denotes the set of agents, mi is the optimal number of orders
per time unit for agent i if she does not cooperate, and a is the fixed cost of an order
(Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (2011)).
6 In the original example the egalitarian allocation is in the core.
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We consider three airline companies, L1, L2, L3 that operate in
the same country. [...] Over time, each firm has learned how
much taillights are used on the average in a year: L1 needs 50
taillights per year, L2 needs 400, and L3 needs 500. The holding
cost to store one light for one year is, respectively, 11, 10 and
9.6 dollars. The cost of placing an order for taillights equals 600
dollars.
This situation defines the inventory cost game with function:
c({1}) = 812.4; c({2}) = 2190.89; c({3}) = 2400;
c({1, 2}) = 2336.7; c({1, 3}) = 2533.6; c({2, 3}) = 3249.6;
c({1, 2, 3}) = 3349.6.
The SOC-rule allocates the total cost c(N) proportionally to the coefficients
ci = c
2({i}), so the normalized characteristics matrix is:
A =
 0.0588 0.4278 0.51340.0588 0.4278 0.5134
0.0588 0.4278 0.5134

Then, the allocation x(α) is in the core of the game for all α ∈ [0, 1], such
that α ≥ αeq u 0.35545, and this value determines the most egalitarian
compromise solution in the core. The allocation proposed by this compromise
solution is xeq = [812.4, 1221.2, 1316]. The SOC-rule proposes the allocation
SOC = [197, 1433, 1719.6], that coincides with the compromise solution for
α = 1. Note that, being the compromise solution as egalitarian as possible,
agent 1 is allocated their maximum rational amount, c({1}). Proposals x(α)
with αeq < α < 1 provide intermediate proposals between xeq and the SOC
solution.
4.2. Claims problems
We now consider a claims problem defined by the pair (M, r), where M
is the endowment and rt = [r1, r2, . . . , rn] are the claims of the agents. The
situation is a conflicting claims problem (bankruptcy) when R =
∑n
i=1 ri >
M. As noticed in Remark 3, the egalitarian proposal
Egali =
M
n
i = 1, 2, . . . , n
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is not in general admissible (that, in this context, means that no agent should
receive more than her claim). In this case, we may find the value of α that
delimits the admissible compromise solutions.
Theorem 5. Let A be a characteristics matrix with row vector ct, and v(α)
the normalized Perron’s eigenvector associated to the Levinger’s transforma-
tion A(α) = αAt + (1 − α)A. Let κ ∈ R, κ > 1. Then, there is αeq ∈ [0, 1]
such that:
v(α) 5 κc⇔ α ≥ αeq.
Proof. If we compute A(α)v(α),
A(α)v(α) = αAtv(α) + (1− α)Av(α) = αc+ (1− α)
(
n∑
i=1
civi(α)
)
e
and, from Theorems 1 and 3, we know that
n∑
i=1
civi(α) =
α
∑n
i=1 c
2
i
λ(α)− 1 + α, λ(α) =
1 +
√
1 + 4α(1− α)B
2
.
Then, we have the inequality
v(α) =
1
λ(α)
A(α)v(α) = 1
λ(α)
(
αc+
α(1− α)∑ni=1 c2i
λ(α)− 1 + α e
)
5 κc
which is equivalent to
α(1− α)∑ni=1 c2i
λ(α)− 1 + α e 5 (κλ(α)− α)c. (1)
Note that the left hand of this inequality is constant for all i. So, as the
entries in c are increasingly ordered, then (1) only requires to be checked for
i = 1,
α(1− α)∑ni=1 c2i
λ(α)− 1 + α 5 (κλ(α)− α)c1, (2)
that obviously holds for α = 1. The following value provides the equality
αeq =
κ2B2c21 − 2κBCc1 + κ(κ+ 1)Bc21 + C2 − (κ+ 1)Cc1 + κc21
κ2B2c21 − 2κBCc1 + (κ2 + 1)Bc21 + C2 − 2Cc1 + c21
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where
B =
∑
i<j
(ci − cj)2 , C =
n∑
i=1
c2i .
In order to prove that for any α ∈ [αeq, 1] the inequality (2) holds, it is
sufficient to observe that the relevant condition is v1(α) ≤ κc1 and that from
Theorem 3 v1(α) is a decreasing function. So, α > αeq, α ∈ [0, 1], implies
v1(α) ≤ v1(αeq) ≤ κc1.
As a consequence we obtain the following result for claims problems.
Corollary 2. Let (M, r), a claims problem and A the characteristics matrix
with ci =
ri∑n
j=1 rj
. Then there is αeq ∈ [0, 1] such that for all α ∈ [αeq, 1]
x(α) is an admissible allocation, that is
x(α) 5 r.
Proof. The compromise solution is x(α) = Mv(α). Then, we only need to
apply Theorem 5 by considering
κ =
∑n
i=1 ri
M
that is greater than 1.
Moreover, as in the case of Subsection 4.1, αeq provides the most egali-
tarian compromise solution among the admissible ones.
Acknowledgments
We are particularly grateful to two anonymous referees and the
Editor for many valuable comments and suggestions that have
led to a substantial improvement in the manuscript. Financial
support from Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness
under Project ECO2013-43119 is gratefully acknowledged. Silva-
Reus also acknowledges financial support from the Generalitat
Valenciana under project PROMETEO/2009/068.
23
References
Berman, A., Plemmons, R., 1994. Nonnegative Matrices in the Mathematical
Sciences. Classics in Applied Mathematics, SIAM, Philadelphia, PA.
Fiedler, M., 1995. Numerical range of matrices and Levinger’s theorem. Lin-
ear Algebra and App. (220), 171–180.
Fiestras-Janeiro, M., Garc´ıa-Jurado, I., Meca, A., Mosquera, M., 2011. Co-
operative game theory and inventory management. European Journal of
Operational Research 210 (3), 459 – 466.
Gime´nez-Go´mez, J. M., Peris, J. E., 2014. A proportional approach to claims
problems with a guaranteed minimum. European Journal of Operational
Research 232 (1), 109–116.
Karsten, F., Basten, R. J., 2014. Pooling of spare parts between multiple
users: How to share the benefits? European Journal of Operational Re-
search 233 (1), 94–104.
Levinger, B., 1970. An inequality for nonnegative matrices. Notices Amer.
Math. Soc. (17), 260.
Meca, A., Timmer, J., Garc´ıa-Jurado, I., Borm, P., 2004. Inventory games.
European Journal of Operational Research 156 (1), 127–139.
Moulin, H., 1988. Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge.
O’Neill, B., 1982. A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud. Mathe-
matical Social Sciences 2 (4), 345–371.
Perron, O., 1907. Zur theorie der matrizen. Math. Ann. (64), 248–263.
Turkensteen, M., Klose, A., 2012. Demand dispersion and logistics costs in
one-to-many distribution systems. European Journal of Operational Re-
search 223 (2), 499–507.
24
